Sunday, April 24, 2011

Some Ponderings on Morality

Does Morality Come from Religion?


It is a commonly held preconception that having, or practicing a certain (as those who hold this conception tend to attribute it to one specific form) religion or belief system is the foundation for the makings of a good person. Although this is not a thesis that can be wholly and conclusively disproved, due to the fact that it deals with issues of belief, rather than knowing, I believe that it can be shown that this conception is highly improbable and, in fact, this very preconception has led to 'immoral' acts in the past. For one, if, say, one religion holds an immutable belief that sexual relations are immoral and will cause one to face severe consequences of some sort, while another religion holds an equally strong belief that sexual relations, in the correct context, are holy and are an intrinsic part of worship for them—then there seems to be a direct conflict between the two beliefs. If these two hypothetical belief systems—let's assume that they are equally prevalent and equally strongly believed by similar population segments—are taken as being true, and it seems that we cannot deny that they are at least true to their believers, then either one belief system is true and the other is not, neither are true, or the preconception that practicing a certain belief system gives one morality is untrue. These seem, at least at initial thought, to be the only possibilities.

The first option seems improbable. While believers of one system may be very attached to their own belief system, their reasoning behind their beliefs seems to come from within that system itself, thus rendering it invalid. Keeping this in mind, it makes sense that very different and even opposing beliefs can be justified in such similar manners. Since the reasoning for religious belief systems almost always comes from within the belief system, the arguments for why a certain act or belief is right or wrong can follow a very similar format and come to very different conclusions by simply pulling whatever evidence is needed into the argument from within the lore of the belief system. Taking this into account, it appears to the unbiased observer that choosing a 'right' belief system is quite arbitrary and thus it's not very likely that the solution to the above mentioned conflict lies in one or the other belief system being truly 'right.'

The second option, that neither are true, implies that no one organized belief system is true. This would seem to imply that there is no morality, since morality, when traced, seems to come from organized belief systems. For example, if an individual was asked, “Why do you believe that you are a good person?” it would not seem unusual for them to reply that they go to church every Sunday, they are loyal to their family, or that they give money to the poor. However, it would be hard to argue with a reply that stated that a person was good because he spent his Sundays working to help others, that abstains from having a family because he is aware of his incapability personally to support one, and who prefers not to give money to the poor because he believes that it demeans them. It seems that each of these individuals has an organized belief system that guides their actions and allows them to believe that they are 'good' human beings. They both seem to be right, at least in the sense that following their personal belief systems does lead them to qualify as 'good' people based on their belief systems. However, their belief systems are contradictory although they both seem to appeal to some sense of 'morality.' It doesn't seem fair to condemn them both to being untrue and it seems that the flaw may come from the belief that morality does come from organized belief systems. This leaves the third possibility—that the preconception that morality comes from certain belief systems is untrue. This would mean that all the beliefs detailed thus far could simultaneously exist and be a part of morality without contradiction. They would not necessarily all be 'good'--the decision of what is good is a separate discussion and brings many more complexities to the table—but they could each be evaluated separately and could compose multiple personal morality's without contradiction.

Monday, April 4, 2011

The Trouble with Relativism (with a historical aside about believing contradictions) - Anonymous

In thinking about what Nagel was trying to communicate with regard to subjectivism, he raises a familiar issue.  It is often the case that subjectivists, no matter the subject, will dogmatically say that there is no objective way the world is.  Yet, in defending the view of subjectivism, they take a very objective stance.  This seems similar to the problem relativists have in their commitment to the idea that there is no true or false, no right or wrong.  Obviously, the statement that "everything is relative" is itself proclaiming an unrelativistic "truth."  This is why Nagel is trying to drive home the point that people who hold radically subjectivist views do not really understand what they are doing -- because holding those views is a kind of acknowledgement of the objective way the world is.  Again, similarly, holding views of relativism, which are assertions of truth, is completely contradictory to the spirit of relativism.  It seems to me, then, impossible to make any claims or assertions at all about the world being either subjective or relative. And perhaps if it is sort of logically impossible to assert a certain point of view, that might help guide us in considering the strength of that view.  By "logically impossible" I mean the kind of fallacy like "p and not p."  The conclusion "p and not p" can never be true.  (By the way, I just googled whether the words "logical impossibility" can ever be used together and I see that this idea is actually controversial.  Apparently, David Hume held that the impossible simply cannot be believed or conceived, but Moritz Schlick claimed that "while the merely practically impossible is still conceivable, the logically impossible, such as an explicit inconsistency, is simply unthinkable."  Moreover "an opposite philosophical tradition, however, maintains that inconsistencies and logical impossibilities are thinkable, and sometimes believable too."  Apparently, Hegel holds this view.  Interesting.)