What if in the middle of the night someone dug a huge pit, so that when I step out my door I fall down and die?
Well, says I, I'll be safe if no one does that.
The more I describe the situation in which I will be safe, the more accurate it becomes.
Example
Opening a door will cause me to step safely outside.
What if it's the door leading to nowhere on a 10-story building?
Opening my house's front door will cause me to step safely outside.
What if there's an ice storm and it's slippery?
Opening my house's front door when there is no ice will cause me to step safely outside.
And so on.
In other words, I know when it's safe when I'm about to open the door and the event closely resembles one in the past when I stepped out safely.
So all I have to do is infinitely describe a scenario in which I was safe that still resembles the current scenario I am in and infinitely open the door and step outside safely. Then, to quote Russell, the general law that that I will be safe when I open my door and step outside shall "approach certainty without limit."
I don't think I've really said anything new here, but it's interesting to think about how we justify day-to-day actions as safe.
Great post! I hope you guys start having as much fun with this as I am!
ReplyDeleteThis is a clever attempt to reply to Hume and Russell on doors leading nowhere. Moreover, I think there is something important about the idea that we can get around, or at least get clearer on, certain philosophical issues by offering ever more detailed descriptions of actions and events. At any rate, I think there is something important to be had in doing so.
And yet... (you knew that was coming, didn't you?) I think you are addressing a somewhat different issue than Russell and Hume are.
It is surely true that you will safely step out the door in each of the circumstances you describe above. But the question is not: Can we describe the circumstances in which our beliefs about the future are true? The question is: How do we know those circumstances will obtain? And you do not answer that question by describing the circumstances in question, no matter how detailed your description gets.
Second, you might be right that as you cross the threshold ad infinitum, your claim to safety on the next occasion will "approach certainty without limit". But that is only if you *assume the truth of the inductive principle* that past conjunctions justify belief in future ones! So, if the question is: What justifies that principle?, then you've begged the question.
Perhaps the correct response is to deny that the inductive principle needs justification?
Or perhaps there's something to that remark make in class about simplicity... ;)
I was thinking that if the inductive principle works an infinite number of times, then it's probably true...
ReplyDeleteis that circular reasoning?
I'm late in answering this, but I think it is circular. The conditional, "If the inductive principle works an infinite number of times, then it is probably true" just is an instance of the inductive principle. (Isn't it? If you don't think it is, by all means explain!)
ReplyDelete