Locke describes primary qualities as "insensible" (section 23). If that is the case, then how can we understand objects through any other way than the secondary qualities?
One primary quality is mobility. A table is incapable of independent movement. How do I know that? Because I have never seen it independently move. So I know that primary quality through sensation...
Ainsley described primary qualities as a "general outline" for an object. But the only way we can understand a general outline of an object is through sensing it.
The more I think about the distinction the more I become confused. Can we never truly know the primary qualities of an idea because the only way for us to know something is through sensation?
Locke says secondary qualities follow primary qualities, but it seems to me the only way we can understand primary qualities is to go 'backwards' from secondary qualities.
Red --> Tomato --> Tomato has color Secondary --> idea --> primary
I'm trying to evoke the discussion in class about the question "is red a primary or secondary quality?" in which I said that people's perceptions of red can be different, but Dr. W said that they all perceive something, which is a color (and that's the primary quality).
This is great! Check out my (longish) post on the primary-secondary quality distinction. I want to respond directly to some of the comments above--but not tonight... Yawn... Too tired... :/ Zzzz....
Alright, I'm going to take a stab at replying to Olive's comments. Let me start with the simplest issue: whether red (or any other color) is a primary or secondary quality. Locke thinks they are secondary. According to Locke, and most other early modern philosophers (and probably a lot of other folks too), objects do not have colors independently of how they affect other things. More precisely: they do not have colors independently of how they affect perceiving beings. So, if there were no perceivers, objects wouldn't have color. Primary qualities aren't like this. Objects have their primary qualities "intrinsically", i.e., independent of how they are related to other objects.
Of course, we do not (at least, I do not think we do) *experience* color this way. We experience color as though it were an intrinsic property of an object, just like shape, size, texture, and so forth. Color *seems* to be an intrinsic property. And I think this is why some of you in class said you thought color was a primary quality. But Locke thinks this is an illusion. It is an illusion brought about by the nature of our IDEAS of color. Our idea of color (that is, our sensation of color) does present color as though it were an intrinsic property of objects--a kind of surface property (usually). But there is a difference between one's idea of color and the secondary quality, color, itself.
So, the reason color seems to be a primary property (according to Locke and others) is two-fold: first, our idea of color presents color as though it were a primary property; second, we confuse our idea of color with color itself. Objects do not (again: I am spelling out the view of Locke and others here) possess color as it is present to us in experience. That is to say, our idea of color is not a property--primary OR secondary!--of objects at all. Color, as a property of objects, as a secondary quality, is not "similar to" color as we experience it (the idea of color).
Is this making sense? Not yet? Well, I still need to create a post discussing our ideas of primary and secondary qualities. Hopefully that will help clear things up.
But here's a confession: I asked the question: Is red a primary or secondary quality? knowing full well it would trip you up and confuse you. I'm sorry. The reason it confused you is that it is difficult to keep clear on Locke's distinction between the secondary qualities (such as color) and our ideas of the secondary qualities (the sensation, or impression, of color). We don't normally distinguish these. When we think of colors--even when we are thinking of color as a property of objects--we think of what Locke calls our idea of color. And that idea "presents color" as though it were a primary quality. Hence your tendency to say "color is a primary quality just like size and shape". But Locke doesn't think the idea of color is a property of objects at all. Insofar as color is a property of objects, it is a disposition to cause ideas of color in perceivers. And that is a secondary quality.
Ok. That's enough for this comment. And just think, all of this was my response to the supposedly *easy* issue!!
Next point! Olive: it is true that we know of primary qualities only through our sensations (ideas). Indeed, Locke thinks that we only know of them by having ideas of secondary qualities. Locke's claim is that you cannot have a sensation of a primary quality alone. It always has to be "cloaked" in ideas of secondary qualities. This seems fairly plausible. You cannot have a visual experience of a shape without its being colored in some way. This is the sense in which primary qualities are "insensible"--you cannot sense them all on their own.
Of course, in another sense we *can* sense primary qualities: they appear as the boundaries of (or locations of changes in) ideas of secondary qualities.
So, I think you are right to say that we know of the primary qualities via the secondary qualities. (Well, via our ideas of secondary qualities.)
But even though this is true (I think), I don't think it follows that we cannot really know the primary qualities of an object. The way in which we have ideas of secondary qualities provides information about the primary qualities. And, according to Locke, our ideas of primary qualities resemble primary qualities themselves--which is why we can know what they are like. (This is not true of our ideas of secondary qualities: they do not resemble the secondary qualities themselves.)
Following up on Olivia's comment in class: How do you accurately distinguish primary v. secondary when you have no experiences to show you otherwise?
ReplyDeleteAwesome! A comment! I'll create a new post for the discussion of primary and secondary qualities!
ReplyDeleteLocke describes primary qualities as "insensible" (section 23). If that is the case, then how can we understand objects through any other way than the secondary qualities?
ReplyDeleteOne primary quality is mobility. A table is incapable of independent movement. How do I know that? Because I have never seen it independently move. So I know that primary quality through sensation...
Ainsley described primary qualities as a "general outline" for an object. But the only way we can understand a general outline of an object is through sensing it.
The more I think about the distinction the more I become confused. Can we never truly know the primary qualities of an idea because the only way for us to know something is through sensation?
wait... if it's not Dr. W, then who is "CRA"??
ReplyDeleteOK, how about this.
ReplyDeleteLocke says secondary qualities follow primary qualities, but it seems to me the only way we can understand primary qualities is to go 'backwards' from secondary qualities.
Red --> Tomato --> Tomato has color
Secondary --> idea --> primary
I'm trying to evoke the discussion in class about the question "is red a primary or secondary quality?" in which I said that people's perceptions of red can be different, but Dr. W said that they all perceive something, which is a color (and that's the primary quality).
Hope this makes some sense....
This is great! Check out my (longish) post on the primary-secondary quality distinction. I want to respond directly to some of the comments above--but not tonight... Yawn... Too tired... :/ Zzzz....
ReplyDeleteAlright, I'm going to take a stab at replying to Olive's comments. Let me start with the simplest issue: whether red (or any other color) is a primary or secondary quality. Locke thinks they are secondary. According to Locke, and most other early modern philosophers (and probably a lot of other folks too), objects do not have colors independently of how they affect other things. More precisely: they do not have colors independently of how they affect perceiving beings. So, if there were no perceivers, objects wouldn't have color. Primary qualities aren't like this. Objects have their primary qualities "intrinsically", i.e., independent of how they are related to other objects.
ReplyDeleteOf course, we do not (at least, I do not think we do) *experience* color this way. We experience color as though it were an intrinsic property of an object, just like shape, size, texture, and so forth. Color *seems* to be an intrinsic property. And I think this is why some of you in class said you thought color was a primary quality. But Locke thinks this is an illusion. It is an illusion brought about by the nature of our IDEAS of color. Our idea of color (that is, our sensation of color) does present color as though it were an intrinsic property of objects--a kind of surface property (usually). But there is a difference between one's idea of color and the secondary quality, color, itself.
So, the reason color seems to be a primary property (according to Locke and others) is two-fold: first, our idea of color presents color as though it were a primary property; second, we confuse our idea of color with color itself. Objects do not (again: I am spelling out the view of Locke and others here) possess color as it is present to us in experience. That is to say, our idea of color is not a property--primary OR secondary!--of objects at all. Color, as a property of objects, as a secondary quality, is not "similar to" color as we experience it (the idea of color).
Is this making sense? Not yet? Well, I still need to create a post discussing our ideas of primary and secondary qualities. Hopefully that will help clear things up.
But here's a confession: I asked the question: Is red a primary or secondary quality? knowing full well it would trip you up and confuse you. I'm sorry. The reason it confused you is that it is difficult to keep clear on Locke's distinction between the secondary qualities (such as color) and our ideas of the secondary qualities (the sensation, or impression, of color). We don't normally distinguish these. When we think of colors--even when we are thinking of color as a property of objects--we think of what Locke calls our idea of color. And that idea "presents color" as though it were a primary quality. Hence your tendency to say "color is a primary quality just like size and shape". But Locke doesn't think the idea of color is a property of objects at all. Insofar as color is a property of objects, it is a disposition to cause ideas of color in perceivers. And that is a secondary quality.
Ok. That's enough for this comment. And just think, all of this was my response to the supposedly *easy* issue!!
Next point! Olive: it is true that we know of primary qualities only through our sensations (ideas). Indeed, Locke thinks that we only know of them by having ideas of secondary qualities. Locke's claim is that you cannot have a sensation of a primary quality alone. It always has to be "cloaked" in ideas of secondary qualities. This seems fairly plausible. You cannot have a visual experience of a shape without its being colored in some way. This is the sense in which primary qualities are "insensible"--you cannot sense them all on their own.
ReplyDeleteOf course, in another sense we *can* sense primary qualities: they appear as the boundaries of (or locations of changes in) ideas of secondary qualities.
So, I think you are right to say that we know of the primary qualities via the secondary qualities. (Well, via our ideas of secondary qualities.)
But even though this is true (I think), I don't think it follows that we cannot really know the primary qualities of an object. The way in which we have ideas of secondary qualities provides information about the primary qualities. And, according to Locke, our ideas of primary qualities resemble primary qualities themselves--which is why we can know what they are like. (This is not true of our ideas of secondary qualities: they do not resemble the secondary qualities themselves.)
Does this help?